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Chapter 7
Investor Knowledge and Experience with
Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers
Angela A. Hung, Noreen Clancy, and Jeff Dominitz1
During the tenure of Chairman Arthur Levitt, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) commissioned the 1995 Report of the Committee on
Compensation Practices (the ‘Tully Report’) responding to a concern
about conflicts of interest in the retail brokerage industry. This report
(Tully and Levitt, 1995) identified ‘best practices’ as those that attempted
to more closely align the interests of the investor, the registered represen-
tative, and the firm. Fee-based accounts, as opposed to commissioned
transactions, were highlighted as a best practice because these reduce the
likelihood of abusive sales practices such as churning, high-pressure sales
tactics, and recommending unsuitable transactions. Fee-based accounts
allow for registered representatives to be compensated based on the
amount of assets in an account regardless of transaction activity.
The release of the Tully report coincided with an increase in competition
in the US retail brokerage industry, as well as falling transaction-based
commissions, the traditional source of income for registered representa-
tives. As a result, more brokerage firms began to offer fee-based programs.
As such fee-based accounts were similar to advisory programs offered by
investment advisers, there was some concern that broker-dealers that of-
fered such accounts would be providing advice that was more than ‘solely
incidental’ to the transaction and trigger application of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (US Statutes, 1940).
The 1940 Act regulates activities of investment advisers, whereas the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (US Statutes, 1934) regulates the activities
of broker-dealers, who are also subject to oversight by self-regulating organi-
zations (SROs). The 1940 Act defines ‘investment adviser’ as ‘any person
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either
directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or
as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or
who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promul-
gates analyses or reports concerning securities’ (US Statutes, 1940). In
order to avoid duplicate regulation of broker-dealer activities, the 1940
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Act makes an exception for ‘any broker or dealer whose performance of
[advisory] services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as
a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor’
(US Statutes, 1940).
The SEC studied these new fee-based brokerage programs and
concluded that they were traditional brokerage offerings that had been
re-priced, rather than new advisory programs. Therefore, in 1999 the SEC
proposed a rule (202(a)(11)-1) that, among other things, exempted
broker-dealers offering fee-based brokerage accounts from being subject
to the Advisers Act. The SEC thought that if the 1940 Act applied to broker-
dealers providing such fee-based programs, it would discourage the
offering of such programs and that these fee-based programs would be
beneficial to brokerage customers (SEC, 2005).
Many commentators on the 1999 proposed rule felt that such an exclu-
sion would blur the lines between broker-dealers and investment advisers,
and it might also confuse investors about their rights and the obligations
owed to them under each type of financial relationship. In response to
these and other comments, the SEC modified and reproposed the rule in
2005. The reproposed rule, ‘Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be
Investment Advisers’, expanded the disclosure requirements of broker-
dealers offering investment advice by ensuring that any advertisements or
literature identifies the account as a brokerage account (SEC, 2005).
Although the 2005 rule has since been vacated, the rulemaking process
did raise concerns by the SEC as to what investors understand regarding
brokerage and advisory accounts, the legal obligations of each type of
account, and the effect of titles and marketing used by investment profes-
sionals on investors’ expectations. As a result, the SEC commissioned the
RAND Corporation to study the issue of what investors understand about
the differences between investment advisers and broker-dealers. As part of
that study, RAND conducted a household survey and a series of focus
groups, to be described later. The policy question of how to address or
harmonize the regulatory differences has recently been resurrected as part
of financial regulatory reform legislation following the 2008 financial mar-
ket collapse.2
This chapter asks what investors understand about a range of issues,
including whether investors understand distinctions between broker-
dealers and investment advisers. We also seek to learn about their experi-
ences interacting with the financial service industry and their expectations
of service provided by individual professionals and firms in the financial
service industry. To address these points, we administered a large-scale
national household survey, and also conducted six intensive focus-group
discussions. The focus groups complement the national survey by
providing a deeper understanding of how investors interact with the
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financial service industry and what they do and do not understand about
the nature of that relationship. Participants in both the survey and the
focus groups represent a range of ages, income levels, and racial and ethnic
groups.
Our results show that most people lack a clear understanding of the
boundaries between investment advisers and broker-dealers. Even those
who have employed financial professionals for years are often confused
about job titles, types of firms with which they are associated, and payments
made for their services. Participants also understand relatively little about
the legal distinctions between investment advisers and broker-dealers. Des-
pite this confusion, people report that they are largely satisfied with the
services they receive from financial professionals.
In what follows, we first review literature on investor perceptions and
expectations of financial service providers. We then discuss results from
our own research, results from a household survey, and focus-group dis-
cussions. The household survey addresses several major topics, including
beliefs about the differences between investment advisers and broker-deal-
ers and experience with different types of financial service providers. The
focus-group results amplify the results from the household survey.
Prior literature: investor perceptions and
expectations of financial service providers
A handful of studies examine investors’ understanding of the differences
between financial service providers, and particularly between investment
advisers and broker-dealers.
The Zero Alpha Group (ZAG, 2004) and the Consumer Federation of
America commissioned a survey of 1,044 investors regarding regulation of
brokers and investment advisers, who were asked, ‘Based on your knowl-
edge of stockbrokers, such as Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Edward
D. Jones, which ONE of the following statements do you believe BEST
describes the services they provide to their customers?’ About the same
fraction (28 percent) of respondents believed that brokers’ primary service
was to provide financial advice, as those who believed that brokers’ primary
service was to conduct stock market transactions (26 percent). When asked
the following question, 86 percent of respondents answered ‘Yes’: ‘Stock-
brokers receive financial incentives from investment product sponsors to
recommend particular investments to their customers. If, for example,
a stockbroker receives cash payments, vacation trips or other forms of
compensation from a mutual fund company as an inducement to sell a
particular mutual fund to his or her clients, should the stockbroker be
required to disclose that fact to a customer buying the mutual fund?’
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Almost all of the respondents (91 percent) reported that they thought
that, if stockbrokers and financial planners offered the same type of invest-
ment advice services, the same investor protection rules should apply.
Further, 65 percent of respondents reported that they would be much or
somewhat less likely to use a stockbroker for investment advice, if brokers
were subject to weaker investor protection rules than financial planners
(Opinion Research Corporation, 2004).
In 2005, the SEC commissioned a study by Siegel and Gale, LLC and
Gelb Consulting Group (2005). Four focus groups of investors in Tennes-
see and Maryland proved not to know the difference between brokers,
financial advisors/financial consultants, investment advisers, and financial
planners.
TD Ameritrade (2006) surveyed 1,000 investors and found that, even
with the new 2005 disclosure rules, investors were still unclear about the
distinction between brokers and investment advisers. When asked, ‘Are you
aware that stockbrokers and investment advisors offer fee-based financial
advice but provide different levels of investor protection?’, 43 percent of
respondents reported they were unaware, and 47 percent of respondents
reported that they did not know that brokers need not disclose all conflicts
of interest. Over 60 percent of respondents believed that brokers had a
fiduciary duty, and 90 percent of respondents believed that investment
advisers had a fiduciary duty. Further, most respondents said they would
not seek services from a broker if they knew that brokerage services
provided fewer investor protections, that brokers lacked a fiduciary duty,
or that brokers were not required to disclose all conflicts of interest. When
shown the 2005 disclosure statement, 79 percent of respondents reported
they would be less likely to seek financial advice from a brokerage firm.
Moreover, 64 percent reported that they did not expect an unbiased
response if they were to ask a broker about the differences between broker-
age and advisory accounts.
A few studies focus on dimensions of service that help determine inves-
tors’ satisfaction with their brokers. Fusilier and Schaub (2003) examine
brokerage clients’ perceptions and points of satisfaction, drawing on two
surveys of investors: one in 1998 (bull market) of 760 respondents, and
another in 2002 (bear market) of 388 respondents. Survey questions asked
about perceptions of broker practices and satisfaction. They found that
satisfaction was influenced by investor perception of broker honesty, ex-
pertise, knowledge, and service. Furthermore, they found that investor
perceptions and level of satisfaction did not change significantly from the
bull to the bear market. In a content analysis of 740 customer reviews of
online brokerage services, Yang and Fang (2004) identified several quality
dimensions related to satisfaction: responsiveness (e.g., prompt service,
order execution, and order confirmation), service reliability (e.g., accurate
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quotes, order fulfillment, and calculation of commissions), competence
(e.g., research capacity), and security (e.g., privacy). Chao et al. (2002)
surveyed 139 investors with assets ranging from $1,000 to $1,300,000 to
investigate features that matter to online traders. The most highly ranked
features were lower trading costs, trading security, customer service, and
technical support. The dimensions that mattered the least were reputation
of the firm, ease of use of the website, reliability of trades, and ease of
account opening and access. Service dimensions such as execution speed,
real-time quotes, and access to IPOs were ranked as only moderately
important.
Perceptions of provider performance
We collected data from US households via an Internet survey of investment
behavior and preferences, experience with financial service providers, and
perceptions of the different types of financial service providers. The survey
was administered to members of the American Life Panel (ALP), a proba-
bility sample of over 1,000 individuals age 18+, who either used their own
computers or a WebTV provided by RAND to participate in the panel.
About once a month, respondents received an email with a request to
visit the website and fill out questionnaires. Typically, an interview took
less than 30 minutes. Respondents were paid an incentive of about $20 per
30 minutes of interviewing (and proportionately less if an interview was
shorter).
The household survey was administered for six weeks, from September
26 through November 6, 2007, and, because it was conducted online, we
had quick access to the results. During this time, 654 households com-
pleted the survey. Respondent age varied from 19 to 89, with average age of
52. Eleven percent of the sample had a household income of less than
$25,000; 22 percent of the sample had a household income between
$25,000 and $50,000; 23 percent of the sample had a household income
between $50,000 and $75,000; and 45 percent of the sample had a house-
hold income over $75,000. More than 98 percent of respondents had a
high school degree or GED, and over half had a bachelor’s degree. ALP
respondents had more education and income than the broader US popu-
lation,3 so our results will likely overstate the levels of financial knowledge,
experience, and literacy of the US population at large.
The survey began with an assessment of investment experience. We then
asked several questions on the differences between investment advisers and
broker-dealers. Next, respondents who used a financial service provider
were asked detailed questions about their interactions with their providers.
Respondents who did not use a financial service provider were asked why
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they did not. Finally, we presented respondents with definitions of a broker
and an investment adviser, including a description of common job titles,
legal duties, and typical compensation. Respondents were then asked to
report the likelihood of their seeking services (in general) from a broker or
investment adviser, the likelihood of seeking investment advice (in partic-
ular) from a broker or investment adviser, and the degree to which they
would trust investment advice from a broker or an investment adviser.
We labeled respondents as ‘experienced’ investors if they held invest-
ments outside of retirement accounts, had formal training in finance or
investing, or held investments only in retirement accounts but answered
positively to questions gauging their financial understanding, such as the
nature and causes of increases in their investments, seeking out informa-
tion about their investments when necessary, and knowing the different
investment options available to them. If respondents did not meet these
requirements, then we labeled them as ‘inexperienced’ investors. We used
an identical classification method to determine participation in the focus
groups. In our sample, about two-thirds of survey respondents were categ-
orized as experienced investors and one-third were categorized as inexper-
ienced investors.
Beliefs about the differences between investment
advisers and brokers
We first presented respondents with a series of specific financial services
and obligations and asked them to indicate which items applied to any
of the following financial service professionals: (a) investment advisers;
(b) brokers; (c) financial advisors or financial consultants; (d) financial
planners; or (e) none of the above.4 Table 7.1 summarizes the survey
results, and shows that respondents perceived differences between invest-
ment advisers and brokers in terms of services provided, as well as duties
and obligations.
Respondents were more likely to report that investment advisers, rather
than brokers, provided advice about securities, recommended specific
investments, and provided planning services. On the other hand, respon-
dents were more likely to say that brokers, rather than investment advisers,
executed stock transactions and earned commissions. Respondents were
slightly more likely to report that investment advisers rather than brokers
were required to act in the client’s best interest and disclose any conflicts of
interest. These differences are small in magnitude, but they are statistically
significant.
Respondents also tended to report that financial advisors and consul-
tants were more similar to investment advisers than to brokers in terms of
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the services provided, compensation methods, and duties. However, as
noted in Hung et al. (2008), financial advisor and financial consultant are
titles commonly used by investment advisory-firm employees as well as
brokerage-firm employees. Furthermore, we present evidence later that
the most common titles of financial service providers that these respon-
dents employ are generic terms, such as advisor or financial advisor.
Respondents who used financial service providers
In our sample, 47 percent of respondents reported that they used a finan-
cial service provider for ‘conducting stock market and/or mutual fund
transactions’ and/or ‘advising, management, and/or planning’.5 These
Table 7.1 Respondent beliefs about financial service professionals (%)
Does the professional: Investment
advisers
Brokers Financial
advisors or
financial
consultants
Financial
planners
None
of
these
Provide advice about
securities (e.g., shares of
stocks or mutual funds) as
part of their regular business
80 63 78 63 3
Execute stock or mutual fund
transactions on the client’s
behalf
29 89 28 23 3
Recommend specific
investments
83 51 72 50 2
Provide retirement planning 51 12 80 91 2
Provide general financial
planning
42 13 80 88 1
Receive commissions on
purchases or trades that the
client makes
43 96 34 22 1
Typically get paid based on
the amount of assets that the
client holds
49 40 50 34 12
Act in the client’s best
interest as required by law
49 42 59 55 19
Disclose any conflicts of
interest as required by law
62 58 57 51 18
Notes : Based on 651 respondents.
Source : Authors’ calculations based on the ALP survey; see text.
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respondents were more likely than other respondents to be over age 40,
have at least a college degree, have household income of at least $75,000,
and be an experienced investor (see Table 7.2). Of the 306 respondents
who reported using a financial service provider, 73 percent reported re-
ceiving professional assistance for advising, management, or planning, and
75 percent reported receiving professional assistance for conducting stock
market or mutual fund transactions. Initially, almost half reported using
professional assistance for both types of services. In discussing the services
they received, respondents were given another opportunity to report
whether their financial service professional provided both types of services.
In response to that follow-up question, we found that more than 70 percent
of the reported financial service professionals provided both types of
services.
We also asked respondents who reported they used a financial service
provider whether there was a specific person, rather than a firm, that
provided these financial services. Almost 81 percent of respondents per-
sonally interacted with an individual professional, and of those respon-
dents, 31 percent personally interacted with more than one individual
professional. Just over one-third (35 percent) reported employing at least
one firm where they did not interact regularly with a specific person. To
better assess whether respondent experiences differed depending on
whether they interacted with a specific individual rather than a firm, we
distinguish between these experiences when presenting results.
Table 7.2 Respondents who use financial professionals by respondent
characteristics (%)
Characteristic Responding yes
All respondents 47.3
40 and older 50.3
Under 40 33.9
College degree or more 55.4
No college degree 38.8
Household income of at least $75,000 55.0
Household income less than $75,000 40.7
Experienced 59.4
Inexperienced 23.4
Notes : Based on 647 respondents’ answers to the question: ‘Do you currently use any profes-
sional service providers for (a) conducting stock market or mutual fund transactions or
(b) advising, management, or planning?’
Source : Authors’ calculations based on the ALP survey; see text.
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Job titles and firm types of financial service providers
Respondents who reported that they used a specific person, or an individ-
ual professional, were then asked for that person’s title (or brief job
description). Respondents gave 449 titles for 323 individual professionals.6
The vast majority (248) of these individual professionals reportedly
provided both advisory and brokerage services, whereas forty-five of these
individual professionals reportedly provided brokerage services but not
advisory services, and thirty-four reportedly provided advisory services but
not brokerage services. Respondents reported a wide variety of titles that
their financial service providers used. Summarized in Table 7.3, the most
commonly reported title is financial adviser or financial advisor, regardless of
the type of service provided by the individual professional. In fact, if these
titles are combined with financial consultant and advisor, they account for
almost one-quarter of all listed titles. Financial planners were listed forty-four
times and Certified Financial Planners (CFPs) were listed twenty-one times.
Broker, stockbroker, or registered representative was used thirty-eight times, and
investment adviser or investment advisor was used twenty-two times.
For any given title, the individual professional was most likely to be
reported as offering both types of services. Reported titles for individual
professionals who provided only advisory services or only brokerage ser-
vices suggest some confusion on respondents’ parts, although these num-
Table 7.3 Professional titles most commonly reported by respondents
Title All
individual
professionals
Provide
advisory
services only
Provide
brokerage
services only
Provide both
types of
services
Advisor 11 1 1 9
Banker 21 2 8 11
Broker, stockbroker,
or registered
representative
38 0 8 30
CFP 21 3 3 15
Financial adviser or
financial advisor
78 7 11 60
Financial consultant 25 2 0 23
Financial planner 44 6 1 37
Investment adviser or
investment advisor
22 3 3 16
President or vice
president
20 0 2 18
Notes: 449 titles were reported. Entries indicate the number of times that the title was reported.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ALP survey; see text.
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bers were small. For example, of the twenty-two individual professionals
with a reported title of investment adviser or investment advisor, respondents
reported that three provided brokerage services only. Furthermore, recall
that responses to the questions on beliefs about financial service providers
indicated that respondents viewed financial advisors or financial consul-
tants as being more similar to investment advisers than to brokers. But
when asked about job titles and service provided, responses indicated that
financial advisors were more likely to provide brokerage services only than
to provide advisory services only. Lastly, we note that twenty-six responses
were left blank or explicitly stated that the respondent did not know the
individual professional’s job title or job description.
Respondents who worked with at least one individual professional were
asked about the kinds of firms that employed the individual professional
who provided financial services. Respondents were then asked to check all
that applied: investment advisory firm, brokerage firm, bank, or other. The
order of the first two categories was randomized between subjects. For firms
that are associated with an individual professional, the most common
response to the type-of-firm question was for the first two categories to be
checked—that is, both investment advisory firm and brokerage firm (see
Figure 7.1). We refer to these firms as dual investment advisory-brokerage firms.
0
10
20
30
40
50
Investment advisory
firms that are not
broker-dealers
Broker-dealer firms
that are not
investment advisory
Dual investment
advisory broker-
dealer firms
Banks Other
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
(%
)
All firms associated with individual professionals (326)
Individual professional at the firm provides respondent with advisory services only (52)
Individual professional at the firm provides respondent with brokerage services only (46)
Individual professional at the firm provides respondent with both types of services (228)
Figure 7.1 Types of firms that employ individual professionals
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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The second most common response is for the category of investment
adviser to be checked but not the brokerage category to be checked. We
refer to these firms as investment advisory firms that are not broker-dealers. There
were fifty-two other firm categories checked, and respondents specified
thirty-seven of them. The most commonly mentioned other type of firm
was insurance firm (ten), and the second most commonly mentioned type
of firm was accounting firm (seven).
Respondents who did not interact with a specific person were asked to
report what kinds of firms they used for financial services. As before,
respondents were asked to check all that applied: investment advisory
firm, brokerage firm, bank, or other, where the order of the first two
categories was randomized between subjects. For firms not associated
with an individual professional, the most common response to the type-
of-firm question was for the brokerage category to be checked, but not the
category for investment advisers to be checked. We refer to these firms as
brokerage firms that are not investment advisers. The second most common is
investment advisory firms that are not broker-dealers (see Figure 7.2).
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Figure 7.2 Types of firms used that are not associated with individual professionals
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Experiences with financial service providers
We also asked respondents detailed follow-up questions on the first indiv-
idual professional or the first reported firm not associated with an individ-
ual professional.7 We received detailed responses on 246 individual
professionals and eighty-five firms. Comparing these professionals and
firms about which respondents gave us detailed information, we found
that the firms were less likely to provide both advisory and brokerage
services, according to our respondents. Of the 246 individual professionals
about whom respondents gave us detailed information, 12 percent
provided advisory services only, 11 percent provided brokerage services
only, and 76 percent provided both types of services. Of the eighty-five
firms about which respondents gave us detailed information, 18 percent
provided advisory services only, 29 percent provided brokerage services
only, and 53 percent provided both types of services.
Methods of payment for financial services
Figure 7.3 shows what methods of payment respondents used for advisory
or brokerage services: commission, rate (hourly, monthly, or annual), flat
fee, a fee determined by a percentage of assets, or other. The most com-
0
10
20
30
40
Commission Hourly, monthly,
or annual rate
Flat fee Percentage fee Other
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
(%
)
Advisory (n = 212) Brokerage (n = 215)
Figure 7.3 Methods of payment to individual professionals for financial services
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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monly reported compensation method to individual professionals for bro-
kerage services was commission (37 percent), and the most commonly
reported compensation method for advisory services was a fee determined
by percentage of assets (35 percent). When asked to estimate their annual
expenditure for the different types of services, respondents whose individ-
ual professional provided advisory services ranged from $0 to $30,000, with
an average of $1,374. Answers from respondents whose individual profes-
sional provided brokerage services ranged from $0 to $21,500, with an
average of $1,131. Yet the median annual expenditure on advisory services
from individual professionals was $125, and the median annual expendi-
ture on brokerage services from individual professionals was $200. The
large difference between average and median expenditure indicates that
a small proportion of respondents reported paying a large amount for
these services. Indeed, 10 percent of the responses on annual expenditure
for advisory services from an individual professional were at least $3,000.
Likewise, 10 percent of the responses on annual expenditure for brokerage
services were at least $2,400.
Many respondents were confused about the methods of payment or the
type of firm with which their individual professional was associated. For
example, eighty-four respondents indicated that they received advisory
services (either alone or in conjunction with brokerage services) from an
investment advisory firm that was not also a brokerage firm. Of these
respondents, 19 percent reported that they paid for these advisory services
based on a percentage fee, and 22 percent indicated that they paid com-
mission for advisory services. However, Hung et al. (2008) found that
97 percent of SEC-registered investment advisers that were not registered
broker-dealers reported that they were compensated by asset-based fees,
and only 10 percent reported that they received commissions.8 Finally,
fourteen respondents did not answer the estimated annual expenditure
question for advisory services, and forty-one reported that they paid $0.
For brokerage services, eighteen respondents did not answer the
estimated annual expenditure question, and thirty-four reported that
they paid nothing.
Respondents also reported that the most common form of compensa-
tion for brokerage services for firms, as opposed to individual professions,
was commission and, for advisory services, was ‘Other’ (see Figure 7.4). The
most common explanations for other responses were that the respondent
did not pay for the service (six responses) or did not know what he or she
paid for the service (four responses). When asked to estimate their annual
expenditures for the services provided by firms, rather than directly from
individual professionals, the respondents’ answers ranged from $0 to
$5,700, with an average of $278. The answers from respondents with
firms providing brokerage services ranged from $0 to $8,000, with an
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average of $476. For advisory services, eight respondents did not answer the
estimated annual expenditure question, and twenty-one reported that they
paid $0. For brokerage services, five respondents did not answer the estim-
ated annual expenditure question, and fourteen reported that they paid
nothing.
How respondents located their financial service provider
Regardless of the types of services received, the most common way in which
respondents found their current individual professional was by referral
from a friend or family. The second most common way was by professional
referral (see Table 7.4). When asked about how respondents found the
current firm that they employed for financial services, the most common
response was ‘Other’. Of the thirty-two other responses, there were nine-
teen explanations. The most frequently mentioned explanation (six re-
sponses) was that the respondent found the firm through their place of
work. The second most common method was by referral from a friend or
family (see Table 7.5).
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Figure 7.4 Methods of payment to firms for professional services
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Length of relationship and satisfaction with financial
service provider
In general, respondents reported that they had been working with the
current individual professional for several years. When respondents were
asked how long they had been working with their current individual pro-
fessional, 34 percent reported at least ten years, 26 percent reported five to
ten years, 32 percent reported one to five years, and 8 percent reported less
than one year. For respondents who received only advisory services and for
respondents who received both types of services from their individual
professionals, the most common length of relationship was more than
ten years. For respondents who received brokerage services only, ten res-
pondents reported that the length of the relationship was between one
Table 7.4 Methods of locating individual professionals (%)
Method All
responses
Advisory
service only
Brokerage
service only
Both types of
services
Professional referral 30.5 23.3 13.8 34.4
Referral from friend
or family
45.6 43.3 34.5 47.8
Mailing 3.3 6.7 0.0 3.3
Print ad 3.8 0.0 6.9 3.9
Television ad 0.8 0.0 3.4 0.6
Internet 1.3 0.0 6.9 0.6
N 239 30 29 180
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ALP survey; see text.
Table 7.5 Methods of locating financial service firms (%)
Method All
responses
Advisory
service only
Brokerage
service only
Both types of
services
Professional referral 18.1 14.3 12.0 22.7
Referral from friend
or family
28.9 28.6 28.0 29.5
Mailing 2.4 0.0 0.0 4.5
Print ad 10.8 7.1 8.0 13.6
Television ad 6.0 0.0 4.0 9.1
Internet 8.4 0.0 12.0 9.1
Other 36.1 50.0 44.0 27.3
N 89 14 25 44
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ALP survey; see text.
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and five years, and nine respondents reported that the length of the
relationship was more than ten years (see Table 7.6).
Most respondents were satisfied with their individual professionals: at
least 70 percent reported that they agreed or strongly agreed with the
statements: ‘I am very satisfied with the service that I receive from this
individual; I trust that this individual acts in my best interest; I believe that
this individual provides me with a valuable service.’ Respondents who had
worked with their individual professional for at least ten years expressed
even greater satisfaction: 78 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they
were very satisfied with the service that they received, 83 percent agreed or
strongly agreed that their individual professional acted in their best inter-
Table 7.6 Length of time with same individual professional and customer
satisfaction (%)
All
responses
Advisory
service only
Brokerage
service only
Both types of
services
About how long have you been doing business with this individual?
Less than 1 year 7.5 20.0 6.9 5.6
1–5 years 31.8 23.3 34.5 32.8
5–10 years 26.4 20.0 27.6 27.2
More than 10 years 34.3 36.7 31.0 34.4
I am very satisfied with the service that I receive from this individual.
Strongly disagree 7.1 0.0 6.9 8.3
Disagree 2.1 3.3 3.4 1.7
Neither agree nor
disagree
15.9 26.7 10.3 15.0
Agree 41.4 43.3 62.1 37.8
Strongly agree 33.5 26.7 17.2 37.2
I trust that this individual acts in my best interest.
Strongly disagree 7.1 0.0 3.4 8.9
Disagree 2.5 6.7 6.9 1.1
Neither agree nor
disagree
15.1 26.7 17.2 12.8
Agree 35.1 33.3 51.7 32.8
Strongly agree 40.2 33.3 20.7 44.4
I believe that this individual provides me with a valuable service.
Strongly disagree 7.5 0.0 6.9 8.9
Disagree 1.7 0.0 6.9 1.1
Neither agree nor
disagree
11.7 20.0 17.2 9.4
Agree 41.0 53.3 51.7 37.2
Strongly agree 38.1 26.7 17.2 43.3
N 239 30 29 180
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ALP survey; see text.
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est, and 82 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they were being provided
with a valuable service (see Table 7.7).
As we found with the results on individual professionals, respondents
tended to be satisfied with their firms. At least 70 percent of respondents
reported that they agreed or strongly agreed with these statements: ‘I am
very satisfied with the service that I receive from this firm; I trust that this
firm acts in my best interest; I believe that this firm provides me with a
valuable service.’ When we condition on the type of service provided, one
category in which respondents indicate a lower level of satisfaction is the
degree to which they trust that the firm that provides brokerage services
acts in their best interest. In this case, only 48 percent of respondents
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. Longer-term relationships
were also rated more positively.
Table 7.7 Length of time with same firm and customer satisfaction (%)
All
responses
Advisory
service only
Brokerage
service only
Both types of
services
About how long have you been doing business with this firm?
Less than 1 year 7.2 7.1 12.0 4.5
1–5 years 25.3 21.4 28.0 25.0
5–10 years 25.3 7.1 32.0 27.3
More than 10 years 42.2 64.3 28.0 43.2
I am very satisfied with the service that I receive from this firm.
Strongly disagree 7.2 7.1 4.0 9.1
Disagree 1.2 0.0 4.0 0.0
Neither agree nor
disagree
19.3 21.4 24.0 15.9
Agree 38.6 35.7 32.0 43.2
Strongly agree 33.7 35.7 36.0 31.8
I trust that this firm acts in my best interest.
Strongly disagree 6.0 7.1 4.0 6.8
Disagree 2.4 0.0 8.0 0.0
Neither agree nor
disagree
31.3 28.6 40.0 27.3
Agree 31.3 35.7 20.0 36.4
Strongly agree 28.9 28.6 28.0 29.5
I believe that this firm provides me with a valuable service.
Strongly disagree 7.2 7.1 4.0 9.1
Disagree 1.2 0.0 0.0 2.3
Neither agree nor
disagree
19.3 21.4 20.0 18.2
Agree 34.9 28.6 36.0 36.4
Strongly agree 37.3 42.9 40.0 34.1
N 83 14 25 44
Source : Authors’ calculations based on the ALP survey; see text.
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Reasons not to use a financial service provider
We asked respondents who reported that they did not use a financial
service provider for the reasons that they did not employ one. Respondents
who used a financial service provider only for advisory services were asked
why they did not use a financial service provider for brokerage services.
Likewise, to respondents who used a financial service provider only for
brokerage services, we asked why they did not use a financial service
provider for advisory services. The results are summarized in Table 7.8.
Respondents were given five choices for why they might not employ a
financial service provider, in addition to an ‘Other’ category, and they were
asked to choose all that applied: no money for investments; too expensive;
too hard to choose one; did not need assistance with financial decisions;
or had one and did not like him, her, or the firm. For respondents who
did not use a financial service provider at all, the most common answer
(47 percent) was ‘No money for investments’. For respondents who did not
use a financial service provider for brokerage services, the most common
specified reason (36 percent) was ‘No money for investments’. Among
respondents who do not use a financial service provider for advisory ser-
vices, the most common reason (18 percent) is that the respondent does
not ‘need assistance with [his or her] financial decisions’.
Relative inclination to seek services from brokers
or investment advisers
Respondents were then presented with definitions of broker and investment
adviser, including a description of common job titles, legal duties, and typical
compensation. We first asked them: ‘On a scale from 0 to 100, what do you
Table 7.8 Reasons given for not using a financial professional (%)
Reason Brokerage and
advisory services
Brokerage
services
Advisory
services
No money for investments 47.1 35.5 17.6
Too expensive 13.2 9.7 20.6
Too hard to choose one 6.2 0.0 2.9
Do not need assistance with
financial decisions
21.5 12.9 52.9
Had one and did not like him,
her, or the firm
8.2 0.0 11.8
N 340 31 34
Source : Authors’ calculations based on the ALP survey; see text.
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think is the percent chance that you will seek (or continue to seek) services
from a [broker/investment adviser] in the next five years?’ For respondents
who reported a positive probability, we followed up with a question on
investment advice: ‘On a scale from 0 to 100, what do you think is the percent
chance that you will seek (or continue to seek) investment advice from a
[broker/investment adviser] in the next five years?’ Last, we asked respon-
dents to rate the degree to which they agreed with the following statement:
‘I would trust investment advice from a [broker/investment adviser].’
As shown in Table 7.9, respondents were roughly equally likely to seek
services in general, and investment advice in particular, from investment
advisers and broker-dealers. On average, respondents were equally likely to
seek services, in general, from investment advisers and brokers, but the
median response was slightly higher for services from an investment adviser
(25 percent versus 20 percent). Almost 29 percent of respondents reported
no chance that they would seek services from a broker, and 28 percent of
respondents reported no chance that they would seek services from an
investment adviser. Among respondents who reported a positive probabili-
ty that they would seek services from a broker or an investment adviser, the
median response indicated an equal willingness to seek investment advice
from either.
Assistance respondents seek for financial matters
We asked all respondents, ‘What kind of professional assistance with finan-
cial matters would you find most helpful at this point in your life?’, with
the following options: asset management, college-saving planning, debt
Table 7.9 Inclination to seek future services from investment advisers and
brokers (%)
Investment adviser Broker
Mean Median N Mean (%) Median N
Percent chance of seeking services
from [investment adviser/broker]
in the next five years
37.1 25 634 36.6 20 637
Percent chance of seeking investment
advice from [investment adviser/
broker] in the next five years
51.9 50 454 47.7 50 458
I would trust investment advice from
[investment adviser/broker] (1 =
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree)
3.4 3 635 3.1 3 637
Source : Authors’ calculations based on the ALP survey; see text.
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consolidation or management, developing a budget and saving plan, estate
planning, executing stock or mutual fund transactions, general financial
planning, investment advising, retirement planning, or other. A majority of
respondents (62 percent) indicated they would like assistance with retire-
ment planning. Many respondents would also like assistance with invest-
ment advising (41 percent), financial planning (38 percent), and estate
planning (35 percent). We replicated the analysis conditioning on age,
education, income, investment experience, and whether the respondent
reported using a financial service provider.9 Across all groups, the most
commonly selected option was ‘retirement planning’. Across all groups,
the second most common was ‘investment advising’, except for respon-
dents who did not have a college degree, respondents who did not report
using a financial service provider, or respondents who were classified as
inexperienced. For the first three of those groups, the second most com-
monly selected option was ‘general financial planning’. For the last group,
respondents classified as inexperienced, the second most commonly select-
ed option was ‘developing a budget and savings plan’.
Focus groups
Focus groups allow for in-depth and interactive discussion of the topics,
and they also allow moderators to follow up on beliefs and understanding
behind responses. Although focus-group participants are not nationally
representative and data collected during focus groups are only qualitative,
this method often provides researchers with important evidence on the
more nuanced issues surrounding topics. To illustrate the understanding
learned from this approach, we first discuss our methodology, followed by
impressions from the focus groups regarding the financial service industry.
We then describe participants’ financial decision-making and experience
with financial service providers. Last, we examine some of the perceived
differences between investment advisers and broker-dealers.
Methods
We conducted six focus groups of ten to twelve participants each, repre-
senting both experienced and inexperienced investors. As with survey
respondents, focus-group participants were deemed to be experienced
investors if they held investments outside of retirement accounts, had
formal training in finance or investing, or held investments only with
retirement accounts but answered positively to questions eliciting their
self-assessed financial understanding (such as the nature and causes
of increases in their investments, seeking out information about their
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investments when necessary, and knowing the different investment options
available to them). Participants who did not meet these requirements were
deemed inexperienced investors.
The sixty-seven participants ranged from 22 to 77 years of age, with two-
thirds of participants older than 40. The mix of racial and ethnic back-
ground included forty-four white but not Hispanic, eighteen black, two
Hispanic, and three Asian participants. The focus groups were held in
Alexandria, Virginia and Fort Wayne, Indiana in September and October
2007. We employed the services of outside firms to recruit our participants.
For the Virginia focus groups, we used a recruiting firm that maintained a
database of approximately 17,000 individuals from the Washington, DC,
metropolitan area, including northern Virginia and parts of Maryland. For
the Indiana focus groups, we used a local recruiting firm that maintained a
database of approximately 35,000 individuals, mainly from Allen County,
Indiana, with a small percentage (9–10 percent) of individuals who reside
in counties immediately adjacent to Allen County. Each location included
two groups of experienced investors and one group of inexperienced
investors. The approximate ratio of two-thirds experienced investors and
one-third inexperienced investors is similar to the ratio among the ALP
respondents. We asked them a range of questions about their level of
understanding and experience with the financial services industry. We
also presented them with sample advertisements from both broker-dealers
and investment advisers, and asked what types of products and services and
levels of interaction they expected from each.
Investment experience
Almost all participants held investments in retirement accounts, primarily
through their employers. Many had investments outside of retirement
accounts, primarily in mutual funds, and some held individual stocks and
annuities. A few individuals who were particularly uncertain about what to
do with their money had put their saving into money-market accounts
(MMA) and certificates of deposit (CDs). These participants felt that they
had received poor financial advice in the past and were unsure how to
invest it, so they went with the perceived security of MMAs and CDs.
Participant age ranged from 22 to 77 years, and investment experience
ranged from 2 to 40 years. Most participants described their level of
financial knowledge as low, including many who had been investing for
several years. About 10 percent of participants considered their level of
financial knowledge to be good or advanced. Participants attributed their
lack of knowledge to having little interest in finances, lack of time to learn
and keep up, and the fact that financial literature is complicated and
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confusing. Some mentioned that conflicting information left them unsure
about which sources to trust.
General impressions of the financial service industry
When asked about their general views of the financial service industry,
participants tended to characterize the industry as complicated. As with
any industry, people felt that there were both honest and dishonest indivi-
duals within the financial service industry. Some noted that recent corpor-
ate scandals (e.g., WorldCom and Enron) led the public to view the
financial services industry with more skepticism. As it is an industry based
on trust, many participants noted that they did not trust the industry. Many
of those with investments acknowledged that they were unsure what they
were being charged for the investments they currently held. They believed
that there were hidden fees and that investment professionals would not
provide them with certain information unless they specifically asked for it.
They believed that one must know the right questions to ask or end up at a
disadvantage. When asked about financial service advertisements they
might have seen, participants believed that advertisements of investment
professionals tried to make people think it was easy to get started and that
the company would work for its clients to help them attain a certain
lifestyle.
Participants cited several reasons they saw as to why people failed to
invest. These included the fact that they thought it was necessary to have
a large amount of disposable income to invest; they had nomoney to invest;
they feared losing their money in investments; they lacked knowledge
about investing; and they believed that the financial service industry was
too complex to navigate.
Investor decision-making and experience
with financial service professionals
Participants reported obtaining information about financial products and
services from a variety of sources, including the Internet, friends and
family, financial magazines, television, prospectuses, presentations at
work, and financial service professionals (including advisers, accountants,
insurance agents, and their bank). Roughly half of participants reported
that they used a financial service provider. Those who had investments but
did not use a financial service provider explained that they trusted them-
selves as much as a professional with their money.
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In fact, trust of the individual financial service professional was the most-
cited feature of what investors sought, cited as more important than trust of
the firm for which that individual worked. Many participants had a prefer-
ence for older, established firms, because they showed staying power and
the ability to ride out hard times. Most participants currently working with a
financial service provider located that provider through personal or pro-
fessional referral. When we asked participants who did not currently use a
financial service provider how they would find one if they chose to employ
one in the future, referral was the most common response. Although the
majority of those who used a financial service provider were happy with the
relationship and the service, several participants did note that they were
unsatisfied, because of lack of personal interaction (these comments were
similar to those reported by ALP respondents). Many respondents had
gone years without hearing from their financial service providers, although
some recognized that they were partly responsible for this lack of commu-
nication. Others noted that their financial service provider did not seem to
do much.
Participants were also asked what they liked about their relationship with
their financial service provider, if they currently used one; otherwise, they
were asked what they would seek in a relationship with a financial service
provider if they were to employ one. Some participants preferred a very
‘hands-off’ relationship, stating that they had neither the inclination nor
the time to follow the markets and were happy to turn that job over to a
professional. Other participants thought that they would like to be a
partner in their financial decisions and to have a say in what was done with
their money. However, these participants tended to realize that there was
much about the financial service industry that they did not know or under-
stand, so it would be important to have a financial service provider who would
take the time to educate them about the market and the various products
available. Many participants felt that, because their assets were too modest,
they would not be of interest to the majority of financial service providers to
spend the necessary amount of time to work with and educate them.
Contact with investment professionals
Some participants said that they would prefer to communicate with an
individual professional via the phone, while others preferred face-to-face
meetings or email. In an ideal relationship, participants felt that they would
want to meet with their representatives more frequently at first (monthly),
and then on a quarterly or semi-annual basis after they felt comfortable in
the relationship. Participants who felt fairly knowledgeable about their
investments sought less contact with their investment professional.
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Desired services
Of those who sought professional help, all cited retirement that would
involve not only saving for retirement but also determining how the
funds should be spent and invested during retirement. The other desired
services that participants mentioned most were education planning, insur-
ance planning, and estate planning. A few participants noted needing help
with budget planning and saving to buy a house. Participants were divided
over whether it was better to have all their investments handled by one firm,
or to have several firms helping them. Convenience was an advantage to
having one firm: the individual professional could see the whole financial
picture and better advise the client and reduce the amount of paperwork to
track. Other participants wanted to spread their investments across a cou-
ple of firms, believing that this would reduce their risks. They also noted
that some firms specialized in certain types of investments and that it might
be better to play to the strengths of certain firms. Still others preferred the
idea of entrusting some of their money to financial service providers but
also investing a portion of their money on their own.
Perceived differences between investment
advisers and brokers
Focus-group participants displayed some confusion regarding the role of
investment advisers and brokers, as observed with ALP respondents; focus-
group discussion helped illuminate the sources of confusion. To assess
participant levels of understanding regarding the roles of various financial
service professionals, we administered a short questionnaire prior to the
detailed discussion on the distinction between investment advisers and
brokers, to capture their understanding on coming into the focus-group
session and not reflect anything they might learn during the focus-group
session. Participants were presented with a series of specific services and
obligations and were asked to indicate which items applied to the following
financial service professionals: investment advisers, brokers, financial advi-
sors, financial consultants, financial planners, or none of the above.
Table 7.10 provides the results of that questionnaire,10 and it indicates that
focus-group responses were quite similar to those of the household survey.
The main differences between focus-group participants and survey res-
pondents were that a much smaller share of focus-group participants
(5 percent) believed that investment advisers received commissions than
did survey respondents (43 percent). Focus-group participants were more
likely to report that both investment advisers and brokers were required to
act in the client’s best interest (64 and 63 percent, respectively) than did
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ALP respondents (49 and 42 percent, respectively). Furthermore, focus-
group participants were more likely than survey respondents to report that
brokers were required to disclose any conflicts of interest. In fact, focus-
group participants were more likely to report that brokers, rather than
investment advisers, must disclose conflicts, whereas ALP respondents were
more likely to report that investment advisers must disclose conflicts.
Reactions to investment advisers’ and broker-dealers’
advertisements
The first set of advertisements presented to focus-group participants
was general advertisements from actual firms taken from magazines, with
identifying information or marks stripped. Firm A’s brokerage services
Table 7.10 Participants’ beliefs about financial service professionals (%)
Does this professional: Investment
advisers
Brokers Financial
advisors or
consultants
Financial
planners
None
of
these
Provide advice about
securities (e.g., shares of
stocks or mutual funds) as
part of their regular business
85 61 76 63 0
Execute stock or mutual fund
transactions on the client’s
behalf
27 84 22 18 0
Recommend specific
investments
93 46 67 46 0
Provide retirement planning 39 12 81 91 0
Provide general financial
planning
33 16 79 91 0
Typically receive
commissions on purchases or
trades that the client makes
5 96 43 33 0
Get paid based on the
amount of assets that the
client holds
51 57 45 19 6
Act in the client’s best
interest, as required by law
64 63 58 57 18
Disclose any conflicts of
interest, as required by law
60 70 61 72 18
Notes: Based on sixty-seven participants.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on focus-group survey; see text.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 25/7/2011, SPi
140 Financial Literacy
Comp. by: pg2846 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001296838 Date:25/7/11
Time:23:20:28 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001296838.3D
advertisement stressed the importance of building a relationship with one’s
financial consultant based on trust. The advertisement further described
financial consultants’ expertise and research tools (with fine print detailing
that the research tools provide general, not personal, advice). The adver-
tisement specifically mentioned mutual funds and stocks. Firm B’s adver-
tisement, taken from an investment advisory firm, stressed the importance
of careful planning so that the reader’s estate would be left to his or her
beneficiaries, rather than to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This
advertisement also highlighted the firm’s experience and expertise. The
advertisement specifically mentioned philanthropy, asset management,
and sophisticated wealth-transfer strategies.
In discussing what appealed to them about Firm A, many participants
mentioned that they liked the trust message and that the advertisement
implied that all of its employees were well trained. A commonly mentioned
dislike of the firm was the fine print detailing that the research tools were
not personal advice. Regarding Firm B, many participants mentioned that
they believed that they thought that they could benefit from its services,
such as asset management. However, given the tone of the advertisement,
many participants also thought that they did not have enough money to be
a client at Firm B.
Inclination to seek services from investment
advisers or brokers
Participants were presented with fact sheets on investment advisers and
brokers, which included the same information as the descriptions given
to ALP survey respondents: definitions of broker and investment adviser,
including a description of common job titles, legal duties, and typical
compensation. Even after being presented with fact sheets, participants
were still confused by the titles. They noted that the common job titles
for investment advisers and broker-dealers were so similar that people
were easily confused about which type of professional they were consult-
ing. Some participants said they knew which type of investment profes-
sional they had, but most did not. Participants expressed interest in the
fact that brokers have to be certified and investment advisers do not.
Several interpreted this to mean that advisers were less qualified than the
brokers.
Many respondents did not understand the term fiduciary and whether
fiduciary was a higher standard than suitability. Some participants did
not think that the legal requirements for either investment advisers or
brokers were stringent enough. Several participants mentioned that, if an
investment adviser made a costly mistake with a client’s money, they
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thought that it would be difficult to prove that the adviser was not acting
in the client’s best interest. Other participants did not like that brokers
had to recommend products that were suitable for them. They thought
that suitable was too vague a term and that it was not clear how the
broker would determine suitability. Many participants also noted that
investment advisers had to disclose conflicts of interest, while brokers
did not.
Conclusion
Our review of the literature and our survey evidence shows that many
people do not understand key distinctions between investment advisers
and broker-dealers—their duties, the titles they use, the firms for which
they work, or the services they offer. Nevertheless, people tend to have
relatively long-term relationships with their financial service profes-
sionals, expressing high levels of satisfaction with their services. This
satisfaction was often reported to arise from the personal attention the
investor received. Unfortunately, we lack evidence on how levels of
satisfaction varied with financial returns, but we know from focus-group
participants with investments that many were unsure about the fees they
paid for their investments. Additionally, people are unclear regarding
the roles of broker-dealers and investment advisers, commenting that
‘We do it all’ advertisements make it difficult to discern broker-dealers
from investment advisers. Furthermore, even though we sought to ex-
plain fiduciary duty and suitability in plain language, respondents strug-
gled to understand the differences between the standards of care. Even
after explaining that a fiduciary duty is generally a higher standard of
care, focus-group participants expressed doubt that the standards are
different in practice.
Despite this confusion, however, most respondents and participants
expressed satisfaction with their financial service providers. The most
commonly cited reasons for the satisfaction of survey respondents were
their professional’s attentiveness and accessibility, mentioned even more
often than expertise. Although focus-groupmembers also mentioned these
qualities, they more often mentioned trust. Finally, respondents and parti-
cipants often indicated that they recognized the value of investment advice.
Those who currently received investment advice often reported that they
found the service to be valuable. Many of those who did not currently
receive investment advice expressed a desire to receive these services, but
they were concerned that their relatively low amount of investable assets
made it difficult to obtain these valuable services.
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Endnotes
1 This chapter is drawn from Hung et al. (2008).
2 As of this writing, a consolidated House and Senate financial regulatory reform
bill had not passed. The House of Representatives version of a financial regula-
tory reform bill passed in December 2009. This legislation directs the SEC to
adopt rules that apply a standard of conduct to broker-dealers and investment
advisers who provide personalized investment advice to retail customers to act in
the best interest of their customers (a fiduciary duty). The Act goes on to say that
broker-dealers are not subject to a continuing duty of care or loyalty to the
customer, after providing personalized investment advice about securities. Bro-
ker-dealers are required to disclose any material conflicts of interest (such as the
sale of only proprietary products) and obtain consent from the customer. In
general, the SEC is directed to require simple, clear disclosures to investors
regarding their relationship with their financial professionals, including any
material conflicts of interest. The SEC is also directed to adopt rules, where
appropriate, to restrict or prohibit sales practices, conflicts of interest, and
compensation schemes by broker-dealers and investment advisers that are con-
trary to investors’ interests. The Senate Banking Committee proposed the 2010
Restoring American Financial Stability Act. This legislation calls for a study by the
SEC on whether brokers should be subject to the same fiduciary standard that
applies to registered investment advisers. Under the bill, the SEC would have one
year to report to Congress on what it finds and another year to implement any
necessary changes.
3 According to the March 2007 Current Population Survey, 85 percent of
Americans aged 18 and older had at least a high school diploma or GED, and
26 percent had at least a bachelor’s degree. The distribution for US household
income is 22 percent with less than $25,000; 27 percent greater than $25,000 but
less than $50,000; 20 percent between $50,000 and $75,000; and 31 percent
greater than $75,000. See US Census Bureau (2007).
4 Between subjects, we randomly varied the order of broker and investment adviser as
they appeared on the computer screen.
5 When we posed the question, ‘Do you currently use any professional service
providers for (a) conducting stock market or mutual fund transactions or
(b) advising, management, or planning?’ we randomly varied the order of the
services between subjects as the question appeared on the computer screen.
6 Some respondents provided more than one title for an individual professional
(e.g., financial planner, stockbroker, and insurance agent).
7 The frequency distributions for these first individual professionals are similar to
those for all individual professionals in the previous section. Likewise, for the first
firm reported, the frequency distribution of firm types is similar to those for all
firms reported. For further details, see Hung et al. (2008).
8 An alternative explanation for this inconsistency could be that the firms that our
respondents used were state-registered rather than SEC-registered firms, and
state-registered firms are less likely than SEC-registered firms to charge asset-
based fees.
9 Complete results are available from the authors by request.
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10 A data appendix (available on request) provides a breakdown of questionnaire
responses by age, education, location, investment experience, and whether the
participant has a financial service provider.
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